The Effectiveness of Futures-based Foreign Exchange Intervention: Comparative Studies of Brazil and India by Syarifuddin, Ferry & Izzulhaq, Syahid
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Effectiveness of Futures-based
Foreign Exchange Intervention:
Comparative Studies of Brazil and India
Syarifuddin, Ferry and Izzulhaq, Syahid
Bank Indonesia Institute
1 December 2020
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/104709/
MPRA Paper No. 104709, posted 16 Dec 2020 08:01 UTC
1 
 
The Effectiveness of Futures-based Foreign Exchange Intervention: 
Comparative Studies of Brazil and India1 
Ferry Syarifuddin2 
Deputy Director, Bank Indonesia Institute 
Syahid Izzulhaq  
Research Assistant, Bank Indonesia Institute 
Abstract 
This paper examines the effectiveness of futures-based foreign exchange (FX) intervention in 
determining the exchange rate dynamics and exchange rate pass-through effect. We 
specifically compare the case of Brazil and India to evaluate and take a lesson learned from 
those countries’ policy designs and outcomes in utilizing the futures-based FX intervention. 
By utilizing autoregressive and distributed lag estimations, our empirical results show that the 
futures-based FX interventions in Brazil are effective in determining the exchange rate 
movement and reducing exchange rate pass-through, while the futures-based intervention in 
India is neutral. The results are also confirmed in the robustness checks estimations. The 
finding implies that the effectiveness of futures-based FX intervention is related to the 
economic-institutional aspects within these countries, which also suggests that an effective 
futures-based FX intervention occurs only under specific circumstances. 
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I Introduction 
Discourses on the FX intervention under the Inflation Targeting Framework in Emerging and 
Developing Economies (ITF-EMDEs) has grown exponentially. The primary concern is that 
conventional wisdom holds that the ITF-central bank should not address the issue of exchange 
rate variability (Masson, Savastano, and Sharma 1997; Mishkin and Savastano 2001; F.S. 
Mishkin and K. Schmidt-Hebbel 2001; McCallum 2007). A clear mandate to the central bank 
with inflation as a single goal suggests that independence for the monetary policy requires a 
free-floating exchange rate. However, most of the central banks in ITF-EMDEs appear to “fear 
of floating” and, thus, they actively involve such intervention in the exchange rate market either 
via foreign exchange intervention (FXI) or even interest rates (Calvo & Reinhart, 2002).  
Given the circumstance, the FX intervention mechanism in EMDEs has been operated 
in various ways. The first mechanism famously called as sterilized FX intervention, which 
mostly operated in the ITF-EMDEs. Ghosh, Ostry, and Chamon (2016) explain that the 
utilization of sterilized FXI as a second instrument effectively improves welfare under inflation 
targeting in EMDEs. Benes et al. (2015) also reveal that when the monetary authority leans 
against the managed float, sterilized FXI effectively insulate the economy against external 
shocks, particularly international financial conditions. Adler, Lama, and Medina (2019) 
suggest that when the central bank possesses a relatively high degree of credibility, sterilized 
FXI could effectively stifle the external shocks (i.e., foreign interest rate and term of trade) on 
both inflation and output 
However, countries like Brazil and India, which are characterized by developed 
derivatives FX markets, have operated not only the sterilized FX intervention but also 
derivatives-based FX intervention. Figure (1) exhibits both futures-based and forwards-based 
FX intervention in Brazil and India. The figure illustrates that the Central Bank of Brazil (CBB) 
has intervened, formally and extensively, in the FX futures market. Given its high liquidity, the 
central bank has been encouraged to intervene more frequently and systematically in this 
market (Upper & Valli, 2016). The futures-based FX intervention3, to some extent, also 
replaced domestic government bonds that were linked to the exchange rate (Kohlscheen & 
Andrade, 2014). For the case of India, the RBI has also intervened through the FX futures 
market, but occasionally and in a limited amount. Given the Indian derivatives market mostly 
concentrated in the OTC market (e.g., forwards), the derivatives-based FX intervention is more 
extensive in the forwards market. The intension of the futures-based FX intervention is merely 
to ensure that the market is well-functioning. On the contrary, the intervention in the forwards 
market comprises the intention to stabilize the exchange rate volatility and to avoid a cash 
crunch in the banking system and the adverse effects from international trade (Bhaumik & 
Mukopadhyay, 2000; Tripathy, 2013). 
 
 
3 We use the term of futures-based FX intervention rather than Brazilian FX swap because (Nedeljkovic & 
Saborowski, 2019) argues that the intervention are more similar to non-deliverable futures. 
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Figure 1  
Derivatives-based FX Intervention in Brazil and India  
Panel A  
FX Intervention in  
the Futures Market 
Panel B 
FX Intervention in  
the Outright Forwards Market 
Source: Bloomberg and CEIC. 
Notes: In Millions of USD. The value denotes net purchase/sale in the derivatives market by the Central Bank. A positive 
value of denotes net purchase, vice versa.  
Several works of literature have emphasized an essential role of futures-based FX 
intervention in exchange rate management in Brazil. Nedeljkovic and Saborowski (2017) found 
that the futures-based FX intervention in Brazil effectively manages the exchange rate 
movement. Mihaljek (2005) proved that such a policy was able to moderate the FX market 
volatility during the exchange rate turbulence. Kohlscheen & Andrade (2014) and Oliveira 
(2020) also found that futures-based FX intervention in Brazil effectively influences both the 
volatility and nominal movements of the spot exchange rate. Intuitively, an effective futures-
based FX intervention ensures the smooth functioning of the FX market, as well as to ensure 
that there is a proper supply of hedging instruments in the market (Kohlscheen & Andrade, 
2014). Gonzalez, Khametshin, Peydró, & Polo (2019) emphasized that the central bank has an 
essential role as the hedger of the last resort. They found that futures-based FX intervention 
significantly reduced the adverse effect of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and Taper tantrum 
on highly-external-resilience banks’ balance sheets; therefore, reducing firm-level 
unemployment in Brazil. 
For the case of India, the RBI involvement in the FX futures market is mostly neutral, 
in which the gross purchases frequently offset the gross sell.4  However, Biswal and Jain (2019) 
argued that an increase in trading activity in the FX futures market could be interpreted as a 
signal for the RBI to intervene through the FX futures market formally. They then argued that 
 
4 See RBI Bulletin, 4. Sale/Purchase of US Dollar by the RBI 
(https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_ViewBulletin.aspx) 
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intervention by the RBI in providing liquidity in the FX futures market could effectively reduce 
the volatility in both the futures market and spot market. Nevertheless, this argument needs to 
be thoroughly scrutinized since Biswal & Jain (2019) only mentioned it but not demonstrated 
this issue.  
In this paper, we will specifically examine the effectiveness of futures-based FX 
intervention in determining the exchange rate dynamics and exchange rate pass-through effect. 
We then compare the case of Brazil and India to evaluate and take a lesson learned from those 
countries’ policy designs and outcomes in utilizing the futures-based FX intervention. As we 
mentioned earlier, they are strikingly different in terms of operating such intervention. This 
investigation thus allows us to answer whether the country-specific aspects of the intervention 
are matter in determining the effectiveness of futures-based FX intervention. To precisely 
address the country-specific aspects, we will also be discussing some key economic-
institutional features in Brazil and India to address the role of the fundamental aspects of 
economic background in determining the outcomes of the futures-based FX intervention.  
Based on our research purposes, this paper thus contributes to the literature by fulfilling 
the following gaps. First, numerous works of literature mainly concentrated on either 
traditional FX intervention (e.g., Adler et al., 2019; Benes et al., 2015; Ghosh et al., 2016) or 
interest rate rules (e.g., Caporale, Helmi, Çatık, Menla Ali, & Akdeniz, 2018; Céspedes, Chang, 
& Velasco, 2004; C. J. Garcia, Restrepo, & Roger, 2011; Mohanty & Klau, 2010), while the 
investigations on derivatives-based intervention in the ITF-EMDEs, especially futures-based 
intervention are remaining limited. Although several works of literature have formally 
examined the effectiveness of futures-based FX intervention in determining the exchange rate 
movement and volatility in Brazil, existing literature has not formally addressed the role of 
futures-based FX intervention in India. Second, existing literature has also not plainly 
examined the role of futures-based FX intervention in reducing domestic ERPT. This issue is 
crucial since the central bank also could act as the hedger of the last resort (Gonzalez et al., 
2019). Third, the comparative studies on this issue between Brazil and India is still unrevealed, 
especially in addition to the elaboration of economic-institutional features associated with the 
countries. Gonzalez et al. (2019), Kohlscheen & Andrade (2014), Nedeljkovic & Saborowski 
(2019), and Oliveira (2020) merely focused on the case of Brazil, while Biswal & Jain (2019) 
merely minimally examined the case of India.  
For the statistical investigations, we conduct two steps of empirical investigation 
comprise the examinations on the role of futures-based FX intervention on exchange rate 
dynamics and exchange rate pass-through effect, respectively. We specifically utilize the 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) to accommodate these objectives. Furthermore, we 
also perform robustness investigations to test whether our empirical results are consistent and 
robust. In this case, we estimate not only one model specification but also the five-best ARDL 
specification based on Schwartz Information Criterion (SC). This strategy is essential to see 
whether our results are consistent in various lag specifications. Second, we estimate the long-
run model using two alternative approaches: Fully Modified OLS (FM-OLS) and Dynamic 
OLS (D-OLS). Those two estimators are frequently utilized in estimating the long-run model. 
The FM-OLS is designed to provide optimal estimates of cointegrating regressions that 
counting the serial correlation effects and the endogeneity in the regressors that results from 
the existence of a cointegrating relationship (Phillips, 1995). On the other hand, the D-OLS is 
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robustly superior in small samples, as well as being able to account for possible simultaneity 
within regressors (Masih & Masih, 1996). 
Our empirical results show that the futures-based FX interventions in Brazil are 
effective in determining the exchange rate movement and reducing exchange rate pass-through, 
while the futures-based intervention in India is neutral. The results are also confirmed in the 
robustness checks estimations. For the case of Brazil, the results support the works conducted 
by Gonzalez et al. (2019), Kohlscheen & Andrade (2014), Nedeljkovic & Saborowski (2019), 
and Oliveira (2020). Furthermore, this finding implies that the effectiveness of futures-based 
FX intervention is associated with several essential aspects such as the historical background 
of the economic transformation, the establishment of the FX futures market, and the tradeoff 
between futures and OTC market development. It suggests that the effectiveness of futures-
based FX intervention occurs only in particular conditions. In this case, therefore, the choice 
of the RBI for the occasional intervention in the futures market could be interpreted as the right 
choice. In contrast to Biswal & Jain (2019), who argued that the RBI should formally intervene 
in the FX futures market for exchange rate management, we argue that it is unnecessary to 
regularly operate the futures-based FX intervention for the objective of exchange rate 
management. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the economic-institution 
features associated with the FX futures market in Brazil and India. Section III elaborates on the 
empirical strategy conducted in this paper. Section IV accommodates the empirical results. 
Section V discusses the concluding remarks.  
II The Economic-institutional Features Associated with the FX Futures Market in Brazil and 
India 
Among the EMDEs, the FX futures activities in Brazilian Real (BRL) and the Indian Rupee 
(INR) are prevalent. The BRL has the largest NAOP in the FX futures market, even the third-
largest in the world after the US Dollar and Euro, and followed by the INR (see Figure 2). In 
the first quarter of 2020, the BRL’s NAOP reached roughly 60 billion US dollars and grown 
over 4 percent in the year-over-year calculation. For the INR, the NAOP has grown 
approximately 40 percent in the first quarter of 2020. However, the size of the NOAP for the 
INR is far too small compared to BRL, or about more than 400 percent smaller than BRL. It is 
also the case that the FX futures market in Brazil is more extensive than in India in terms of 
daily average turnover. In March 2020, the BRL daily average turnover reached almost 40 
billion US dollars, while the INR was about more than 350 percent smaller than that. It implies 
that the FX futures market for the BRL is larger and more developed than the INR’s FX futures 
market. 
However, the FX market in Brazil and India has a strikingly different structure, 
although the FX derivatives market in both countries is more active than the spot market (see 
Figure 3). In Brazil, the FX derivatives markets are concentrated in outright forwards, non-
deliverable forwards, and futures markets with each market contribution about 30 percent, 25 
percent, and 24 percent of the total daily average turnover in 2019, respectively. The FX futures 
market in Brazil is continuously expanding throughout 1998 and 2019, although it was reduced 
in 2013 due to the non-deliverable forwards introduction to handling the taper tantrum. In India, 
the FX derivatives markets are mainly concentrated only in outright forwards and non-
deliverable forwards by 36 percent and 29 percent, respectively. Meanwhile, the FX futures 
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market has only 4 percent of the total daily average turnover in 2019. Although the FX futures 
market in Brazil is more extensive than in India, the Over-the-counter (OTC) FX derivatives 
market in India (i.e., outright forward and non-deliverable forward) is approximately two times 
bigger than Brazil in terms of the total daily average turnover, especially in 2019. 
Figure 2  
The FX Futures Market Activities, 1993-2020 
Panel A Quarterly Notional Amount of Outstanding Positions, 1993-2020 (Millions of 
USD) 
Panel B Daily Average Turnover – Notional Amounts, 1993-2020 (Millions of USD) 
Source: Exchange-traded Derivatives Statistics, BIS. 
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These differences in both the development of the FX futures market and the FX 
derivatives market structure in Brazil and India are inherently associated with regulatory 
backgrounds. 
The robust and unique structure of the FX markets in Brazil is related to several 
regulatory backgrounds – including not only financial regulation but also fiscal policy – and 
the existence of the FX futures market as the oldest FX derivatives instrument.5 International 
Monetary Fund (2018) noted that a relatively small spot FX market in Brazil reflects the 
regulation constraint that allows only several agents to access the spot FX market directly. 
Based on the Decree-Law no. 857, every contract, security, document or obligation, in order to 
be fulfilled in Brazil, cannot stipulate payment in gold or foreign currency, or, in any form, 
restrict or refuse fulfillment in the Brazilian currency. The exceptions to that law are currency 
exchange operations, import/export contracts, export financing (when a Brazilian bank buys, 
paying in Reals, in advance, the amount of foreign currency to be received by an exporter in 
an export operation) or loans or any obligations in which the creditor or debtor is domiciled 
outside Brazil (International Monetary Fund, 2015). Since the FX futures contract is non-
deliverable; therefore, the resulting of limited internal convertibility gives incentives to hedge 
in the FX futures market. The Brazilian legal and regulatory framework also puts constraints 
by levying tax on revenues and cash flows rather than income or value-added; hence, 
encouraging the migration of trading to exchanges (Upper & Valli, 2016). These restrictions 
aim to anticipate the adverse-effect of speculation in the spot FX and, on the one hand, it also 
develops a relatively large and robust FX futures market.  
Figure 3  
The FX Derivatives Market Activities in Brazil and India, 1998-2019 
Panel A Brazil 
 
Panel B India 
 
5 Brazilian Real US dollar futures contracts were launched on August 1, 1991. 
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Source: Triennial Central Bank Survey and Exchange-traded Derivatives Statistics, BIS. 
The FX futures market also has been serving a vital role in accommodating hedging in 
Brazil. After the Brazilian currency crisis in the 1990s, the over-burdened foreign debt has 
encouraged the use of FX futures for hedging (Upper & Valli, 2016). Also, the eligibility to 
issue the main futures contract (DOL) limited on two groups, i.e., authorized dealers and other 
companies whose primary activity is related to the transactions regulated for this market (i.e., 
exporters/importers, permitted financial services and capital flows).6 It effectively anticipates 
the misuse of the FX futures market as a hedging market. Given the well-developed FX futures 
market in Brazil, the price discovery in the Brazilian spot FX market is even highly determined 
by the FX futures market (M. Garcia, Medeiros, & Santos, 2015). 
 On the contrary, the FX futures market in India is one of the less developed FX 
derivatives markets. As we discussed earlier, the FX futures market has only 4 percent of the 
total daily average derivatives turnover in 2019, although the RBI has raised the single 
investment limit to USD 100 million per user compared with a meager USD 15 million per 
exchange for dollar-rupee pair in February 2018.7,8 The first reason why the FX futures market 
in India is far less-developed than OTC FX derivates such as forward is that it was introduced 
lately.  While the FX futures was firstly launched in 2008, the OTC FX markets were already 
becoming the main instrument of the economic agent to manage their risks since India’s 
financial reforms to fully convertible currency in 1994 (Gopinath, 2010). Also, in contrast to 
the Brazilian FX Futures market, the regulation allows resident individuals to hedge their 
 
6 Brazilian Mercantile & Futures Exchange (BM&F). 
7 Economic Times, India Times. RBI eases limit in exchange traded currency futures market. Link: 
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/forex/rbi-eases-limit-in-exchange-traded-currency-futures-
market/articleshow/62820152.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cpps.  
8 Based on (Reserve Bank of India, 2008; p.47), the role of Reserve Bank of India in FX futures market includes: 
“stipulating or modifying the participants and/or fixing participant-wise position limits or any other prudential 
limits in the interest of financial stability. Such over-riding powers are not without a parallel and are also used 
by other regulators in their respective jurisdictions. Illustrations of such emergency powers include being 
empowered to order the Exchange to take actions specified by the regulator. Such actions could include imposing 
or reducing limits on positions, requiring the liquidation of positions, extending a delivery period or closing a 
market.” 
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underlying or anticipated exposures in the FX futures market without any limitation on the 
background of agents’ economic activities. In this regard, therefore, the FX futures market is 
unlikely to replicate the discipline of ensuring underlying commercial transactions and fulfill 
the genuine hedging requirements of the participants, which is possible in the OTC market 
(Gopinath, 2010).  
Table 1  
Economic-Institutional Differences Between Brazil and India 
Aspects Brazil India 
Economic Transformation The Plano Real (1994) Financial Reforms (1993) 
Introduction of the FX 
Futures Market 
1991 2008 
Agent’s Eligibility in The 
FX Futures Market 
Restricted Unrestricted 
Development of the FX 
Futures Market 
Well-developed Least-developed 
Let us now summarize the central aspects that differentiate the FX futures market in 
Brazil and India. The first aspect is the different path of economic transformation between 
Brazil and India. In Brazil, the Plano Real (1994) leads to restricted direct access to the spot 
market and lower internal convertibility. Only a few agents could directly access the spot 
market, and BRL is strictly domestic inconvertible. Both restriction on the spot FX market and 
limited internal convertibility induce the transaction in the derivatives market, and especially 
in the FX futures market (Upper & Valli, 2016). While Indian financial reforms transformed 
the INR to be fully convertible (Gopinath, 2010), the non-deliverable contract in the FX futures 
market inadequately gives incentives to hedge in the FX futures market under fully convertible 
currency in India. Second, the FX futures market in Brazil is more mature than that in India in 
terms of the establishment date. While the FX futures market is one of the oldest derivatives 
markets in Brazil (1991), the Indian FX futures market was introduced in 2008. In India, the 
OTC FX market was already established even before the launching of the FX futures market. 
It makes the FX futures market in India is likely to subordinated by the OTC markets. Third, 
In Brazil, the eligibility to issue the main futures contract (DOL) is limited to ensure the well-
functioning hedging in the FX futures market. On the contrary, hedging activities in the FX 
futures market are vulnerable to be misused. Therefore, the FX futures market is unlikely to 
fulfill the genuine hedging requirements of the participants, which is possible in the OTC 
market (Gopinath, 2010). 
III Empirical Strategy 
A. Data and Variables 
In this paper, we use two separated time-series data from Brazil and India. For Brazil’s dataset, 
it comprises monthly data from 2011:09 to 2018:12, while India’s dataset includes monthly 
data from 2014:10 to 2018:12. For the observation selection, this paper considers the following 
reasons: First, we utilize the monthly-based data for the estimations in order to incorporate with 
the macroeconomic data. Second, the observation for India represents the initial intervention 
of the RBI in the FX futures market (see RBI Bulletin, 2015). More specifically, the period 
included in India’s estimations disregard the Global Financial Crisis; therefore, we select the 
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observation for Brazil from 2011 in order to prevent incomparable observation with India, 
while minimizing the small observation.9 By this, our observations potentially generate a small 
sample bias. It is thus necessary to check whether our estimations are consistent. In this regard, 
we utilize robustness strategies to ensure that our estimations are consistent, although with 
relatively small observations (see in the Robustness Tests section for details).10  
The details of the description of the variable and descriptive statistics are exhibited in 
the following two tables (Table 2 and 3): 
Table 2  
Variable Description 
Notes: We operate seasonal adjustment on our variables to avoid seasonal bias in monthly-base data. We also 
standardize the variables to accommodate the comparative analysis within and between countries using ?̆?𝑖 =(𝑥𝑖−?̅?𝜎𝑖 ). 
Variables Description Data Transformation Unit of Account Source 
Spot FX 
intervention (𝑆𝐼) Changes in the stock of FX 
reserves 
- Millions of USD IMF 
Futures-based FX 
intervention (𝐹𝐼) 
Changes in the 
total outstanding 
amount of FX 
futures positions 
held by the 
central bank 
- Millions of USD Bloomberg 
Domestic interest 
rates (𝑟𝑑) Policy rate - Basis Point IMF and CEIC 
Economic growth (𝑦) Industrial Production Index 
(IPI) 
Log-differenced Index IMF 
Exchange rates (𝑆) Nominal FX Log-differenced and Logarithm Returns and Log IMF 
Consumer Price 
Index (𝐶𝑃𝐼) CPI Log-differenced Percentage BIS 
FX futures 
contract price (𝐹) FX futures rate Log-differenced Percentage Change Bloomberg 
US interest rates (𝑟𝑈𝑆) Fed fund rate Log-differenced Basis Point FRED 
Log-differenced Index  FRED 
 
9 As discussed by Laeven & Valencia (2013), the GFC was ended in 2011. 
10 We also utilize the D-OLS estimation for the robustness test, which is robustly superior in small samples, as 
well as being able to account for possible simultaneity within regressors (Masih & Masih, 1996). 
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Variables Description Data Transformation Unit of Account Source 
Economic growth (𝑦𝑈𝑆) Industrial Production Index 
(IPI) 
Trade Balance (𝑇𝐵) Net export - Millions of USD DOTS, IMF 
Import Price  
Commodity 
Import Price 
Index 
Logarithm Index DOTS, IMF 
Table 3  
Descriptive Statistics 
Notes: Panel A and B exhibit the results of descriptive statistics for Brazil and India, respectively. Data is normalized using ?̆?𝑖 = (𝑥𝑖−?̅?𝜎𝑖 ). For Brazil’s dataset, it comprises monthly data from 2011:09 to 2018:12, while India’s dataset includes monthly 
data from 2014:10 to 2018:12. 
Panel A Brazil 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Observations 
Exchange Rate -5.00E-16 0.3677 1.8356 -1.5367 1.0057 88 
FX Futures Rate 2.47E-16 0.3808 1.8106 -1.6057 1.0057 88 
Foreign Exchange 
Intervention 
-0.00135 -0.1187 5.0292 -4.9709 1.0057 88 
Futures-based 
Intervention 
3.53E-17 0.0570 3.1159 -3.2352 1.0057 88 
Policy Rate -1.33E-15 0.1094 1.4438 -1.4666 1.0057 88 
Industrial Production, 
Log 
-9.42E-15 -0.1443 1.6487 -1.6642 1.0057 88 
Consumer Price, Log -1.34E-14 0.0678 1.4285 -1.6589 1.0057 88 
Net Export 1.41E-16 -0.0522 1.9423 -2.0811 1.0057 88 
Fed Fund Rate 1.21E-16 -0.5442 3.0447 -0.6907 1.0057 88 
US Industrial 
Production, Log 
2.06E-14 -0.1529 2.3952 -2.0770 1.0057 88 
Import Price Index, Log -2.83E-16 -0.0261 1.4993 -1.9001 1.0057 88 
Exchange Rate, Log 1.04E-15 0.4669 1.5873 -1.7513 1.0057 88 
Panel B India 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Observations 
Exchange Rate -2.63E-15 -0.020 2.929 -1.821 1.010 51 
FX Futures Rate 3.73E-15 0.045 3.061 -1.778 1.010 51 
Foreign Exchange 
Intervention 
-0.00707 -0.125 2.615 -2.125 1.010 51 
Futures-based 
Intervention 
-5.93E-18 0.000 2.721 -2.721 1.010 51 
Policy Rate 1.40E-15 -0.270 2.400 -1.140 1.010 51 
Industrial Production, 
Log 
-2.87E-14 -0.093 1.918 -2.081 1.010 51 
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 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Observations 
Consumer Price, Log 2.47E-14 0.014 1.742 -1.866 1.010 51 
Net Export 8.34E-16 -0.090 2.082 -2.058 1.010 51 
Fed Fund Rate 3.83E-16 -0.581 2.316 -0.990 1.010 51 
US Industrial 
Production, Log 
1.58E-14 -0.197 2.223 -1.402 1.010 51 
Import Price Index, Log -2.49E-16 0.042 1.591 -2.626 1.010 51 
Exchange Rate, Log -6.96E-15 0.000 2.817 -1.888 1.010 51 
B. Econometric Method 
In economics, the role of lapse of time is crucial. The relationship between, for instance, two 
variables (𝑌, 𝑋) is rarely contemporaneous (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). The response of 𝑌 to 𝑋 
frequently takes a lapse of time, so-called lags. On the other hand, value of the current variable 
also impacts its lagged value. For instance, inflation rates theoretically inertial in which means 
that the lagged value of inflation shapes the current inflation. In econometrics, the 
autoregressive form could handle this kind of issue (Baltagi, 2008). Also, in economics, the 
dependent variable is frequently influenced by its lagged value (i.e., autoregressive form) and 
lagged regressor (i.e., distributed-lag). In this regard, it thus takes a form of the autoregressive 
and distributed-lag model (ARDL). Besides, according to Pesaran & Shin (1999), modeling the 
ARDL with the appropriate lags will correct for both serial correlation and endogeneity 
problems. In general, the ARDL (𝑝, 𝑞) model is expressed as follows: 
 𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑌𝑡−𝑖𝑝𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑡−𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=0 + 𝜀𝑡 (1) 
To illustrate particular features of the ARDL model, we take the simplest ARDL model 
for the example. Suppose we have ARDL (1,1) with 𝐼𝐼𝐷(0, 𝜎𝜀) and no time trend as follows: 
 𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜌𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝛽0𝑋𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 (2) 
Alternatively, by assuming that |𝜌| < 1, equation (2) can be re-expressed in the long-
run equilibrium formation. Under static long-run equilibrium, where 𝑌𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡−1 = 𝑌∗ and 𝑋𝑡 =𝑋𝑡−1 = 𝑋∗, and the disturbance is set equal to zero; thus, we could generate as the following 
equation: 
 𝑌∗ = 𝛼1 − 𝜌 + 𝛽0 + 𝛽11 − 𝜌 𝑋∗ (3) 
One of the crucial features of the model (3) is the long-run coefficient (or multiplier) 
expressed by 
(𝛽0+𝛽1)1−𝜌 . It explains the long-run consequences of the changes in regressor upon 
the dependent variables in which are calculated as the sum of 𝛽. We then proceed to obtain the 
short-run formation of equation (2) by replacing 𝑌𝑡 with 𝑌𝑡−1 + ∆𝑌𝑡 and 𝑋𝑡 by 𝑋𝑡−1 + ∆𝑋𝑡: 
 ∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽0∆𝑋𝑡 − (1 − 𝜌)𝑌𝑡−1 + (𝛽0 + 𝛽1)𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 (4) 
Alternatively, it can be expressed as follows: 
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 ∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽0∆𝑋𝑡 − (1 − 𝜌) [𝑌𝑡−1 − 𝛼1 − 𝜌 − 𝛽0 + 𝛽11 − 𝜌 𝑋𝑡−1] + 𝜀𝑡 (5) 
The equation above expresses the error correction model (ECM). Besides, the term 
within the bracket represents the deviation of 𝑌𝑡−1 from the long-run equilibrium term 
corresponding to the 𝑋𝑡−1. In other words, the ECM analysis gives us an explanation about 
how fast model equilibrium deviation is adjusted for each period.  
Empirically, many works of research employ the ARDL bounds testing approach in 
which the most straightforward specification is stated as the following equation: 
 ∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽1∆𝑌𝑡−1𝑝𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝛽2∆𝑋𝑡
𝑝
𝑖=0 + 𝛿1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 (6) 
From equation (6), we can infer that the cointegration does not exist when 𝛿1 = 𝛿2 =0  while the cointegration exists when 𝛿1 ≠ 𝛿2 ≠ 0. The test for the cointegration employs 𝐹 
statistics to investigate the existence of long-run equilibrium. We then compared the 𝐹 statistics 
with its critical values developed by Pesaran, Shin, & Smith (2001). Null hypothesis (𝐻0) 
stands for no cointegration, 𝛿1 = 𝛿2 = 0, while the alternative hypothesis (𝐻𝑎) states the 
existence of cointegration, 𝛿1 ≠ 𝛿2 ≠ 0. Specifically, when the calculated 𝐹 statistics are 
higher than the critical values developed by Pesaran et al. (2001); hence, the 𝐻𝑎 cannot be 
rejected, and the underlying variables are cointegrated over time. 
C. The Model Estimates 
We aim to study the experience from Brazil and India in utilizing the FX futures market as one 
of the FX intervention toolkits to manage the exchange rate movements and reduce the 
exchange rate pass-through effect (ERPT).  
For the first model estimate, we adopt a generic exchange rate specification in a simple 
form of autoregressive distributed lag (e.g., see Richard, 2016). Since there is a bidirectional 
relationship between FX interventions and exchange rates (Nedeljkovic & Saborowski, 2019), 
the ARDL model with the appropriate lags could correct both serial correlation and 
endogeneity problems (Pesaran & Shin, 1999).  We thus specify the model estimate as follows: 
 
∆(log 𝑆𝑡) = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖∆(log 𝑆𝑡−𝑖)𝑝𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝜕𝑖∆(log 𝐹𝑡−𝑖)
𝑞
𝑖=0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑆𝐼𝑡−𝑖𝑣𝑖=0+ ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝐹𝐼𝑡−𝑖𝑏𝑖=0 + 𝑿′𝜽 + 𝜀𝑡 
(7) 
Where ∆(log 𝑆𝑡), ∆(log 𝐹𝑡), 𝑆𝐼𝑡, 𝐹𝐼𝑡, and 𝑿 are the spot exchange rate returns, log-differenced 
of FX futures rate, central bank direct FX intervention via spot market, FX intervention through 
derivatives market (i.e., futures market), and vector of control variables, respectively. While 𝛽𝑖, 𝜕𝑖, 𝛾𝑖, and 𝛿𝑖 are parameters associated with lagged log(∆𝑆𝑡) , log (∆𝐹𝑡), 𝑆𝐼𝑡, 𝐹𝐼𝑡. The 
control variables for exchange rate movements follow a generic specification that comprises 
domestic inflation rate, domestic economic growth, domestic interest rate, trade balance, Fed 
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Fund Rate (FFR), and US economic growth. The length of the lag, 𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑣, and 𝑏 determined 
by the Schwartz Criterion (SC).  
For the second model estimate, we utilize the standard ERPT model specification (e.g., 
Jaffri, 2010; Xu et al., 2019). However, we extend the model by including the interaction term 
of both spot FX intervention and futures-based FX intervention to analyze the effect of each 
intervention on the pass-through effect. The empirical model is expressed as the following 
equation: 
ln 𝜏𝑡 = 𝜑 + ∑ 𝜔𝑖 ln 𝜏𝑡−𝑖𝑝𝑖=0 + ∑ ℓ𝑖 ln 𝑆𝑡−𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=0 + ∑ 𝜍𝑖(ln 𝑆𝑡−𝑖 × 𝑆𝐼𝑡−𝑖)𝑣𝑖=0 + ∑ ψ𝑖(ln 𝑆𝑡−𝑖 × 𝐹𝐼𝑡−𝑖)𝑏𝑖=0 + 𝜇𝑡 (8) 
Where 𝜏𝑡, 𝜍𝑖, and ψ𝑖 respectively denote the import price index, the interaction term coefficient 
of FX intervention, and the interaction term coefficient of futures-based FX intervention. To 
illustrate how interaction terms determine the pass-through effect, we transform equation (8) 
into the long-run equation as follows: 
 ln 𝜏𝑡 = ℓ ln 𝑆𝑡 + 𝜍(ln 𝑆𝑡 × 𝑆𝐼𝑡) + ψ(ln 𝑆𝑡−𝑖 × 𝐹𝐼𝑡−𝑖) + ℇ𝑡 (9) 
By simplifying equation (9), we then obtain the equation as follows: 
 
ln 𝜏𝑡 = (ℓ + 𝜍𝑆𝐼𝑡 + ψ𝐹𝐼𝑡) ln 𝑆𝑡 + ℇ𝑡 ln 𝜏𝑡 = 𝜆 ln 𝑆𝑡 + ℇ𝑡 (10) 
Where (ℓ + 𝜍𝑆𝐼𝑡 + ψ𝐹𝐼𝑡) = 𝜆. In this equation, 𝜆 denotes the ERPT coefficient in which 
defines as the percentage change in domestic import prices resulting from changes in the 
exchange rate (Jaffri, 2010). However, the value of 𝜆 is also determined by 𝜍 and ψ in which 
implies that the FX intervention and futures-based FX intervention would affect the impact of 
changes in exchange rate on imported inflation. 
D. Unit Root Tests, ARDL Bound Test, and Classical Assumptions 
In this section, we perform three crucial pre-estimation tests for the empirical models. The tests 
comprise unit root tests, ARDL bound test, and classical assumptions. For the unit root tests, 
we employ the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test for three different unit root specifications, 
which include the test with constant, constant, and trend, and without constant and trend. For 
the ARDL bound test, we perform the F Wald test, which is compared to the tables of Pesaran 
et al. (2001). The test suggests that the empirical model is not cointegrated if the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected. For the last pre-estimation tests, we employ fundamental classical 
assumption tests as follows: Normality test assumption, 𝜇𝑖~𝑁(0), using Jarque-Berra test; the 
absence of heteroscedasticity, 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖) = 𝜎2, estimated using Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey; and no 
autocorrelation, 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑡 , 𝜀𝑘|𝑋𝑡, 𝑋𝑘) = 0; 𝑡 ≠ 𝑘 (see Gujarati and Porter 2009). 
D1. The First Model Estimate 
We now begin by discussing the unit root tests. Table (9) exhibits the results of unit root tests 
for Brazil and India. For Brazil’s variables, we generally find that most of the variables are 
stationary at a different level (see Table 9, Panel A). Specifically, we find that policy rate, FX 
intervention, and futures-based FX intervention are consistently stationary at the level. For the 
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rest of the variables, we observe that these variables are stationary at the first difference. For 
India’s variables, we find that FX intervention and futures-based FX intervention are 
significantly stationary at the level. For other variables, including exchange rate, FX futures 
rate, industrial production (log), consumer price (log), and net export, are significantly 
stationary at the first-difference. Lastly, a set of external economic variables, i.e., Fed Fund 
Rate (FFR) and US industrial production (log) are stationary at the first-difference. Generally 
speaking, our unit root tests suggest that each variable is stationary at a different level, either 
variable for Brazil, India, or external factors. Therefore, the empirical models estimating the 
role of futures-based FX intervention on exchange rate dynamics perhaps cointegrate in the 
long-run (e.g., see Gujarati & Porter, 2009).  
16 
 
Table 4  
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit Root Test  
Panel A Brazil 
Variables 
Level First Difference 
With Constant With Constant & Trend  Without Constant & Trend  With Constant With Constant & Trend  Without Constant & Trend  
t-Statistic Prob. t-Statistic Prob. t-Statistic Prob. t-Statistic Prob. t-Statistic Prob. t-Statistic Prob. 
Exchange Rate -0.9656 0.7623 - -2.1364 0.5182 - -0.9767 0.2918 - -6.7230 0.0000 *** -6.6811 0.0000 *** -6.5241 0.0000 *** 
FX Futures 
Rate 
-0.8844 0.7889 - -2.0134 0.5857 - -0.9030 0.3223 - -9.9323 0.0000 *** -9.8728 0.0000 *** -9.6761 0.0000 *** 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Intervention 
-8.5717 0.0000 *** -8.6056 0.0000 *** -8.6221 0.0000 *** -11.2812 0.0001 *** -11.2110 0.0000 *** -11.3475 0.0000 *** 
Futures-based 
Intervention 
-6.3187 0.0000 *** -6.3341 0.0000 *** -6.3558 0.0000 *** -10.2976 0.0000 *** -10.2345 0.0000 *** -10.3602 0.0000 *** 
Policy Rate -3.0633 0.0333 ** -3.0058 0.1369 - -3.0751 0.0025 *** -1.5822 0.4872 - -1.6681 0.7567 - -1.6313 0.0967 * 
Industrial 
Production, 
Log 
-0.8253 0.8066 - -1.6326 0.7718 - -0.8397 0.3493 - -10.9740 0.0001 *** -10.9069 0.0000 *** -10.8822 0.0000 *** 
Consumer 
Price, Log 
-1.4438 0.5571 - -0.2462 0.9910 - -0.9605 0.2984 - -4.8456 0.0001 *** -5.0631 0.0004 *** -1.2911 0.1801 - 
Net Export -1.2623 0.6438 - -4.7040 0.0014 *** -1.2848 0.1820 - -10.4352 0.0000 *** -10.4106 0.0000 *** -10.4692 0.0000 *** 
Fed Fund Rate 3.1864 1.0000 - 1.7404 1.0000 - 1.3317 0.9531 - -2.4581 0.1294 - -4.3168 0.0048 *** -1.8473 0.0619 * 
US Industrial 
Production, 
Log 
-0.4139 0.9012 - -0.9996 0.9382 - -0.4727 0.5081 - -8.5501 0.0000 *** -8.5301 0.0000 *** -8.0435 0.0000 *** 
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Panel B India 
Variables 
Level First Difference 
With Constant With Constant & Trend  Without Constant & Trend  With Constant With Constant & Trend  Without Constant & Trend  
t-Statistic Prob. t-Statistic Prob. t-Statistic Prob. t-Statistic Prob. t-Statistic Prob. t-Statistic Prob. 
Exchange Rate -1.7698 0.3908 - -2.057 0.556 - -1.8232 0.0653 * -5.2412 0.0001 *** -5.1773 0.0005 *** -5.1061 0.0000 *** 
FX Futures 
Rate 
-1.8462 0.3545 - -2.090 0.539 - -1.8759 0.0584 * -7.1169 0.0000 *** -7.0411 0.0000 *** -7.0725 0.0000 *** 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Intervention 
-4.8291 0.0002 *** -5.062 0.001 *** -4.8795 0.0000 *** -11.2434 0.0000 *** -11.1235 0.0000 *** -11.3618 0.0000 *** 
Futures-based 
Intervention 
-8.0896 0.0000 *** -8.026 0.000 *** -8.1771 0.0000 *** -7.8761 0.0000 *** -7.8211 0.0000 *** -7.9605 0.0000 *** 
Policy Rate -2.6425 0.0914 * -0.722 0.966 - -2.5963 0.0104 ** -7.5766 0.0000 *** -9.1271 0.0000 *** -7.2076 0.0000 *** 
Industrial 
Production, 
Log 
-0.4746 0.8871 - -7.127 0.000 *** -0.9405 0.3045 - -8.3782 0.0000 *** -8.2823 0.0000 *** -12.1510 0.0000 *** 
Consumer 
Price, Log 
-0.6829 0.8415 - -2.139 0.512 - -0.7615 0.3813 - -6.0957 0.0000 *** -6.0462 0.0000 *** -4.5699 0.0000 *** 
Net Export -2.1303 0.2341 - -3.232 0.090 * -2.1544 0.0313 ** -8.1280 0.0000 *** -8.1873 0.0000 *** -8.2222 0.0000 *** 
Fed Fund Rate 2.1103 0.9999 - -0.788 0.960 - 0.1953 0.7386 - -2.4171 0.1426 - -9.1127 0.0000 *** -1.2487 0.1918 - 
US Industrial 
Production, 
Log 
0.7762 0.9927 - -1.031 0.930 - 0.7212 0.8676 - -5.9817 0.0000 *** -7.6789 0.0000 *** -5.9662 0.0000 *** 
Notes: Panel A and B exhibits the stationary tests for Brazil and India, respectively. The null hypothesis stands for the absence of unit root. The asterisk denotes statistical significance *, **, and *** at 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
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Table 5  
Best Ten ARDL Specification and Bound Test  
Panel A Brazil 
No ARDL Model SC Log-likelihood F Wald test Prob. 
1 ARDL (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1) -0.5931 72.27474 2.881644 0.0049 
2 ARDL (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2) -0.5691 73.05797 3.07721 0.0030 
3 ARDL (1,1,1,1,2,1,1,1,1,1) -0.5529 72.37022 2.968815 0.0040 
4 ARDL (1,1,1,2,1,1,1,1,1,1) -0.5487 72.19148 3.002017 0.0037 
5 ARDL (1,1,1,2,1,1,1,1,1,2) -0.5422 74.13763 3.214488 0.0022 
6 ARDL (1,2,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1) -0.5407 71.85089 2.594056 0.0106 
7 ARDL (1,1,1,1,2,1,1,1,1,2) -0.5383 73.96852 3.156396 0.0025 
8 ARDL (2,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1) -0.5321 71.48701 2.861392 0.0053 
9 ARDL (1,1,1,1,1,1,2,1,1,1) -0.5315 71.45775 2.818667 0.0059 
10 ARDL (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,3) -0.5314 73.27522 3.309091 0.0018 
Panel B India 
No ARDL Model SC Log-likelihood F Wald test Prob. 
1 ARDL (1,2,2,3,1,3,3,3,3,3) 1.12205 41.00941 3.373922 0.0250 
2 ARDL (1,2,2,3,1,3,1,3,2,3) 1.125124 35.16196 3.376046 0.0168 
3 ARDL (2,1,2,3,1,3,1,3,2,3) 1.126129 35.13834 3.769811 0.0104 
4 ARDL (1,2,2,3,1,3,3,3,2,3) 1.126741 38.97410 3.550693 0.0178 
5 ARDL (2,1,3,3,1,3,1,3,3,3) 1.129486 38.90958 3.722957 0.0148 
6 ARDL (1,2,2,2,1,3,3,3,2,3) 1.137797 36.78921 3.933995 0.0101 
7 ARDL (2,1,2,3,1,3,1,3,3,3) 1.141735 36.69667 3.540433 0.0157 
8 ARDL (2,1,2,3,1,3,3,3,2,3) 1.144848 38.54857 3.892744 0.0124 
9 ARDL (2,1,2,3,1,3,3,3,3,3) 1.149247 40.37027 3.617784 0.0194 
10 ARDL (2,1,3,3,1,3,3,3,3,3) 1.153981 42.18411 3.639889 0.0224 
Notes: Panel A and B exhibits the best ten ARDL specifications and bound test for Brazil and India, respectively. F Wald test is 
compared to the tables of Pesaran et al. (2001). The null hypothesis stands for the absence of cointegration. Variables ordering: 
Exchange Rate, FX Futures Rate, Foreign Exchange Intervention, Futures-based Intervention, Policy Rate, Industrial Production 
(Log), Consumer Price (Log), Net Export, Fed Fund Rate, and US Industrial Production (Log). 
Let us now proceed by analyzing the ARDL bound tests, which displayed in Table (10). In 
this case, we specifically employ ten ARDL specifications based on Schwartz Criterion (SC). For 
the model estimate of the Brazilian case, we find that all specifications produce statistically 
significant F-Wald tests, which suggest that these specifications are significantly cointegrated. For 
the empirical model estimating the case of India, we also find that the entire ARDL specifications 
are significantly cointegrated at a five percent confidence level.  Based on these tests, it thus 
implies that we should include not only a long-run estimation but also short-run estimation 
analyzing the error correction mechanism in the empirical model for the case of Brazil and India.  
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Table 6 
Classical Assumptions 
Panel A Brazil 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Jarque-Bera Test 6.1296** 6.1895** 5.1924* 0.4189 0.6391 
Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey Test (F-
Stat) 
1.4182 1.3611 1.3009 2.3236*** 2.2468*** 
Durbin-Watson Stat 1.9630 1.9557 1.9767 1.8923 1.8890 
Panel B India 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Jarque-Bera Test 1.6360 2.1107 1.6630 1.9229 1.8708 
Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey Test (F-
Stat) 
0.8625 1.0993 1.6139 1.0402 0.8639 
Durbin-Watson Stat 1.5926 1.5387 1.7430 1.5896 1.8087 
Notes: Panel A and B exhibit the results of classical assumptions for Brazil and India, respectively. The asterisk denotes statistical 
significance *, **, and *** at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
Lastly, we perform three tests (to examine whether the model estimates contain the 
violation of the classical assumptions. In this case, we investigate the classical assumption tests 
for the five-best ARDL specifications. For the case of Brazil, we find that the first three 
specifications are not normally distributed, while the last two specifications are significantly 
suffering from heteroskedastic problems. However, all of the five-best specifications are freed 
from autocorrelation. Furthermore, classical assumption tests for the case of India indicate that all 
of the five-best specifications are normally distributed with a homoscedastic error. Based on these 
tests of classical assumptions violation, we perform HAC robust standard error for all Indian case 
regressions, since it contains autocorrelation problems, and for the last two model specifications 
for the Brazilian case regression as it suffers from heteroskedastic error distribution. 
D2. The Second Model Estimate 
Let us now begin by discussing the unit root tests, which are displayed in Table (14). For Brazil’s 
variables, we find that import price (log) and exchange rate (log) are not stationary in level, while 
the interaction terms variables are already stationary at level for any conventional confidence level. 
In the first difference, we find that all of Brazil’s variables are statistically stationary. For India’s 
variables, the results of the ADF unit root tests indicate that import price (log) and exchange rate 
(log) are significantly non-stationary at level but statistically stationary at the first-different. In 
contrast, the interaction terms variables are stationary at level. In summary, the variables for Brazil 
and India are commonly stationary at a different level where import price (log) and exchange rate 
(log) are non-stationary at level while the interaction terms variables are stationary. Therefore, the 
empirical models estimating the role of futures-based FX intervention on exchange rate dynamics 
perhaps cointegrate in the long-run (e.g., see Gujarati & Porter, 2009). 
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Table 7  
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit Root Test 
Panel A Brazil  
At Level 
 Import Price, Log Exchange Rate, Log 
Exchange  
Rate, Log  × Foreign  
Exchange Intervention 
Exchange Rate,  
Log  × Futures-based  
Intervention 
With 
Constant 
t-Statistic -1.3081 -1.1021 -9.5042 -6.7268 
Prob. 
0.6227 0.7119 0.0000 0.0000 
- - *** *** 
With 
Constant 
& Trend  
t-Statistic -1.6985 -2.0371 -9.4556 -6.7004 
Prob. 
0.7437 0.5727 0.0000 0.0000 
- - *** *** 
Without 
Constant 
& Trend  
t-Statistic -1.3099 -1.0864 -9.5604 -6.7663 
Prob. 
0.1746 0.2493 0.0000 0.0000 
- - *** *** 
At First Difference 
With 
Constant 
t-Statistic -6.2397 -6.4197 -8.9802 -10.6759 
Prob. 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
*** *** *** *** 
With 
Constant 
& Trend  
t-Statistic -6.1853 -6.3868 -8.9240 -10.6106 
Prob. 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
*** *** *** *** 
Without 
Constant 
& Trend  
t-Statistic -6.2140 -6.1571 -9.0330 -10.7408 
Prob. 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
*** *** *** *** 
Panel B India 
At Level 
 Import Price, Log Exchange Rate, Log 
Exchange 
Rate, Log  × Foreign 
Exchange Intervention 
Exchange Rate,  
Log  × Futures-based 
Intervention 
With 
Constant 
t-Statistic -2.0515 -1.6224 -4.8478 -8.0846 
Prob. 
0.2647 0.4637 0.0002 0.0000 
- - *** *** 
With 
Constant 
& Trend 
t-Statistic -3.4698 -1.9673 -5.0812 -8.0241 
Prob. 
0.0540 0.6042 0.0007 0.0000 
* - *** *** 
Without 
Constant 
& Trend 
t-Statistic -2.0676 -1.6809 -4.8985 -8.1720 
Prob. 
0.0382 0.0874 0.0000 0.0000 
** * *** *** 
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At Level 
 Import Price, Log Exchange Rate, Log 
Exchange 
Rate, Log  × Foreign 
Exchange Intervention 
Exchange Rate,  
Log  × Futures-based 
Intervention 
At First Difference 
With 
Constant 
t-Statistic -5.7891 -5.1947 -11.2691 -7.8591 
Prob. 
0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
*** *** *** *** 
With 
Constant 
& Trend 
t-Statistic -5.7640 -5.1323 -11.1489 -7.8064 
Prob. 
0.0001 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 
*** *** *** *** 
Without 
Constant 
& Trend 
t-Statistic -5.8439 -5.0817 -11.3878 -7.9426 
Prob. 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
*** *** *** *** 
Notes: Panel A and B exhibits the stationary tests for Brazil and India, respectively. The null hypothesis stands for the absence of 
unit root. The asterisk denotes statistical significance *, **, and *** at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively 
Table 8  
Best Ten ARDL Specification and Bound Test  
Panel A Brazil 
No ARDL Model SC Log-likelihood F Wald test Prob. 
1 ARDL (1,1,1,1) -0.32689 34.10088 1.715224 0.1552 
2 ARDL (1,1,1,2) -0.28712 34.41588 1.898346 0.1195 
3 ARDL (1,2,1,1) -0.28121 34.16458 1.82242 0.1334 
4 ARDL (1,1,1,3) -0.22095 33.64933 1.83913 0.1305 
5 ARDL (1,1,1,4) -0.19634 34.66123 1.809627 0.1365 
6 ARDL (1,1,3,2) -0.19148 34.62683 1.220830 0.3096 
7 ARDL (1,3,1,2) -0.18815 34.48712 2.180602 0.0797 
8 ARDL (1,1,2,3) -0.18680 34.43067 1.379765 0.2495 
9 ARDL (1,2,1,3) -0.18027 34.15642 1.964321 0.1091 
10 ARDL (2,2,2,1) -0.17997 34.30449 1.229391 0.3059 
Panel B India 
No ARDL Model SC Log-likelihood F Wald test Prob. 
1 ARDL (1,4,1,1) 1.689807 -15.8937 1.058896 0.3918 
2 ARDL (2,4,1,1) 1.753283 -15.4393 0.729567 0.5782 
3 ARDL (1,4,1,2) 1.771795 -15.8651 0.92525 0.4611 
4 ARDL (1,4,2,1) 1.773033 -15.8936 0.987512 0.4279 
5 ARDL (1,1,4,1) 1.798062 -18.3836 1.346890 0.2728 
6 ARDL (3,1,1,1) 1.804959 -21.2407 0.849400 0.5034 
7 ARDL (4,1,1,1) 1.807050 -18.5903 0.880832 0.4857 
8 ARDL (1,1,1,4) 1.809675 -18.6507 1.267858 0.3017 
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No ARDL Model SC Log-likelihood F Wald test Prob. 
9 ARDL (1,3,1,1) 1.818871 -21.5677 1.680186 0.1759 
10 ARDL (1,1,1,3) 1.820645 -21.6094 1.472138 0.2310 
Notes: Panel A and B exhibits the best ten ARDL specifications and bound test for Brazil and India, respectively. F Wald test is 
compared to the tables of Pesaran et al. (2001). The null hypothesis stands for the absence of cointegration. Variables ordering: 
Import price index (log), the exchange rate (log), the interaction variable of FX intervention, and the interaction variable of futures-
based FX intervention. 
For the ARDL bound tests, the results are displayed in Table (8). In this case, we 
specifically employ ten ARDL specifications based on Schwartz Criterion (SC). For the model 
estimate of the Brazilian case, we find that all specifications produce statistically insignificant F-
Wald tests, which suggest that these specifications are significantly cointegrated at any confidence 
level. For the empirical model estimating the case of India, we also find that the entire ARDL 
specifications are statistically not cointegrated at any confidence level. Based on these tests, it thus 
implies that our empirical models commonly generate no error correction terms. In this regard, 
therefore, we focus our empirical estimations on the long-run analysis. 
Table 9 
Classical Assumptions 
Panel A Brazil 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Jarque-Bera Test 4.3242 4.3986 3.8504 6.5572** 6.6073** 
Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey Test (F-
Stat) 
2.0470* 1.7964* 1.9381* 2.1470** 1.9196* 
Durbin-Watson Stat 1.3207 1.3253 1.3076 1.2862 1.2982 
Panel B India 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Jarque-Bera Test 48.0707*** 51.1584*** 34.5647*** 44.0119*** 43.0153 
Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey Test (F-
Stat) 
1.0582 1.1392 0.9714 1.0040 1.1667 
Durbin-Watson Stat 1.2791 1.4750 1.3148 1.2694 1.3868 
Notes: Panel A and B exhibit the results of classical assumptions for Brazil and India, respectively. The asterisk denotes statistical 
significance *, **, and *** at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
For the last pre-estimation tests, we examine the classical assumptions. In this case, we 
investigate the classical assumption tests for the five-best ARDL specifications. For the case of 
Brazil, we find that the last two specifications are not normally distributed, while the first three 
specifications are normally distributed. However, all of the five-best specifications prone to 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity regression problems. Furthermore, classical assumption 
tests for the case of India indicate that four out of five model specifications are normally 
distributed. However, we find that the empirical models for the Indian case statistically suffer from 
heteroskedastic error and autocorrelation problems. Based on these tests of classical assumptions 
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violation, we thus perform HAC robust standard error for all empirical models, either the case of 
Brazil or India. 
IV Results and Discussion 
A. The Futures-based FX Intervention and Exchange Rate Dynamics 
Our main empirical results are displayed in Table (12) and (13), which portray both long-run and 
short-run estimations analyzing the role of futures-based FX intervention on exchange rate 
dynamics in Brazil and India.  
First, we shed light on the long-run effect of futures-based FX intervention on exchange 
rate dynamics in Brazil (see Table 12, Panel A). Our long-run estimations consistently indicate 
that traditional futures-based FX intervention (net purchase) appreciates the Brazilian Reals 
currency, although it is only statistically significant in column (4) and (5) estimations. This finding 
is consistent with several works of research analyzing the role of futures-based FX intervention in 
Brazil. (Nedeljkovic & Saborowski, 2019) found that the CBB FX intervention of every US$1 
billion in the FX futures market appreciates the real/dollar exchange rate by about 0.7 percent. 
(Kohlscheen & Andrade, 2014; Oliveira, 2020) illustrated that to the extent that an intervention in 
the supply of SCC derivatives alters the supply of hedging instruments that are available in the 
market; hence, such intervention will affect the relative demand for USD dollars in the market and, 
as a consequence, the prevailing USDBRL exchange rate. 
For the case of India, we find no evidence concerning the long-run effect of the futures-
based FX intervention on exchange rate dynamics, although the estimations consistently generate 
negative coefficients. In this case, we conjecture that several causes distinguish the effectiveness 
of futures-based FX intervention in India from the case of Brazil. The FX derivatives market 
structure in India is dominated in the OTC market, while the FX futures market has only 4 percent 
of the total daily average derivatives turnover. In India, the OTC FX markets were already 
becoming the main instrument of the economic agent to manage their risks since India’s financial 
reforms to fully convertible currency in 1994 (Gopinath, 2010). the FX futures market is also 
unlikely to replicate the discipline of ensuring underlying commercial transactions and fulfill the 
genuine hedging requirements of the participants, which is possible in the OTC market (Gopinath, 
2010). Given the structure of the Indian FX derivatives market, the FX operation by the Central 
Bank in the FX futures mostly neutral in terms of the gross purchases in the FX futures market 
typically offset the gross sell, which intended merely to ensure that the market is well-functioning 
(Tripathy, 2013). 
Table 10  
Long-run Estimations 
Panel A: Brazil 
 1 2 3 4 5 
FX Futures Rate 
0.980464*** 
(0.020725) 
0.983947*** 
(0.021339) 
0.984568*** 
(0.022237) 
1.001813*** 
[0.019171] 
1.002998*** 
[0.018905] 
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Panel A: Brazil 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Foreign Exchange 
Intervention 
0.0029 
(0.010546) 
0.003071 
(0.01071) 
0.002153 
(0.011216) 
0.009235 
[0.008507] 
0.008877 
[0.008299] 
Futures-based 
Intervention 
-0.010051 
(0.009494) 
-0.011113 
(0.00967) 
-0.010389 
(0.00973) 
-0.031957** 
[0.012421] 
-0.03242*** 
[0.012205] 
Policy Rate 
0.014818 
(0.015845) 
0.012977 
(0.016948) 
0.013922 
(0.017592) 
0.013169 
[0.013163] 
0.013796 
[0.013853] 
Industrial Production, 
Log 
0.002731 
(0.026536) 
0.005383 
(0.02721) 
0.005312 
(0.028199) 
0.031513 
[0.026835] 
0.033628 
[0.027679] 
Consumer Price, Log 
0.033983 
(0.029584) 
0.038402 
(0.030188) 
0.03500 
(0.030302) 
0.041397 
[0.030833] 
0.043718 
[0.032014] 
Net Export 
-0.025068 
(0.015285) 
-0.026373* 
(0.015495) 
-0.02696* 
(0.016078) 
-0.031013** 
[0.012532] 
-0.031753** 
[0.012703] 
Fed Fund Rate 
0.028581 
(0.023946) 
0.025233 
(0.025421) 
0.025352 
(0.025785) 
0.033098* 
[0.018054] 
0.033371* 
[0.018698] 
US Industrial 
Production, Log 
-0.020559 
(0.016426) 
-0.022381 
(0.017068) 
-0.019098 
(0.016955) 
-0.022418 
[0.013813] 
-0.024385* 
[0.014553] 
Panel B: India 
 1 2 3 4 5 
FX Futures Rate 
1.014112*** 
[0.087640] 
0.987549*** 
[0.056016] 
0.960179*** 
[0.065635] 
1.003212*** 
[0.07289] 
0.972976*** 
[0.07556] 
Foreign Exchange 
Intervention 
-0.012773 
[0.035681] 
-0.01677 
[0.029029] 
-0.035598 
[0.036905] 
-0.012246 
[0.034735] 
-0.017589 
[0.041587] 
Futures-based 
Intervention 
-0.027513 
[0.132959] 
-0.062291 
[0.122035] 
0.028247 
[0.178115] 
-0.061026 
[0.140413] 
0.04828 
[0.171291] 
Policy Rate 
-0.039465 
[0.133462] 
-0.010294 
[0.08858] 
0.017354 
[0.11557] 
-0.033081 
[0.119013] 
0.038538 
[0.116939] 
Industrial Production, 
Log 
-0.35332*** 
[0.117652] 
-0.45919*** 
[0.06869] 
-0.47075*** 
[0.106314] 
-0.43235*** 
[0.076134] 
-0.389462** 
[0.139682] 
Consumer Price, Log 
0.166832 
[0.294691] 
0.367696*** 
[0.122431] 
0.361987** 
[0.157508] 
0.299269 
[0.187873] 
0.297731 
[0.187863] 
Net Export 
0.100616 
[0.062928] 
0.135205** 
[0.052406] 
0.150235* 
[0.074629] 
0.135757** 
[0.059402] 
0.091212 
[0.091781] 
Fed Fund Rate 
0.288054* 
[0.150370] 
0.18048 
[0.11358] 
0.290499** 
[0.128261] 
0.198581 
[0.120126] 
0.314339** 
[0.140218] 
US Industrial 
Production, Log 
0.011484 
[0.110241] 
0.072658 
[0.097961] 
0.016437 
[0.137699] 
0.075951 
[0.110948] 
-0.052393 
[0.138092] 
Notes: The asterisk denotes statistical significance *, **, and *** at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. Numbers in 
the parentheses ( ), represent the standard error. Numbers in the square brackets [ ], represent the HAC-corrected standard error. 
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For the rest of the variables, the long-run effect estimations find the following results: First, 
we find that the FX futures rate is positively and statistically significant in determining the 
exchange rate movements in the long run, either in Brazil or India. For the case of Brazil, (M. 
Garcia et al., 2015) have revealed that the FX futures market profoundly influences the price 
discovery in the Brazilian spot FX market. Besides, it also consistently aligns with the Covered 
Interest Rate Parity (CIRP) theory, which is the actualization of the law of one price between two 
countries’ interest rates adjusted to the FX hedge value. For the domestic factors, our estimations 
find that the Indian exchange rate is significantly affected by domestic economic growth, the 
inflation rate, and net export, while the Brazilian exchange rate dominantly driven by net export. 
Furthermore, we find that external factors have no long-run effect on Real’s exchange rate, while 
the FFR significantly influences Indian Rupee in the long-run. These findings are reasonable since 
both countries have different institutional settings concerning currency convertibility restrictions. 
In Brazil, the Plano Real (1994) leads to restricted direct access to the spot market and lower 
internal convertibility. Only a few agents could directly access the spot market, and BRL is strictly 
domestic inconvertible, which limits excessive jumps in the exchange rate market (Upper & Valli, 
2016), while Indian financial reforms transformed the INR to be fully convertible (Gopinath, 
2010). 
Table 11  
Short-run Estimations  
Panel A Brazil  
 1 2 3 4 5 ∆ FX Futures Rate 0.545117*** 
(0.027932) 
0.548805*** 
(0.028406) 
0.547651*** 
(0.028462) 
0.590163*** 
[0.026598] 
0.590946*** 
[0.026779] ∆ Foreign Exchange 
Intervention 
0.003361 
(0.00438) 
0.003451 
(0.004456) 
0.003146 
(0.004528) 
0.006495 
[0.004009] 
0.006552 
[0.004035] ∆ Futures-based 
Intervention 
-0.014081** 
(0.005466) 
-0.014804*** 
(0.005541) 
-0.013914** 
(0.005553) 
-0.013605** 
[0.005497] 
-0.013882** 
[0.005525] ∆ Futures-based 
Intervention (Lagged) 
   0.028455*** 
[0.005272] 
0.028176*** 
[0.005326] ∆ Policy Rate 0.032996 
(0.043149) 
0.028517 
(0.043873) 
0.032667 
(0.0503) 
0.010098 
[0.039436] 
0.008394 
[0.039844] ∆ Policy Rate 
(Lagged) 
  -0.030637 
(0.048537) 
  ∆ Industrial 
Production, Log 
0.009063 
(0.01333) 
0.011745 
(0.013459) 
0.009971 
(0.013827) 
0.020388 
[0.012491] 
0.021971* 
[0.012573] ∆ Consumer Price, 
Log 
0.389639*** 
(0.138512) 
0.462421*** 
(0.140046) 
0.372541*** 
(0.14027) 
0.397639*** 
[0.126195] 
0.454850*** 
[0.126930] ∆ Net Export -0.013824 
(0.008669) 
-0.014604* 
(0.008729) 
-0.014762* 
(0.008763) 
-0.010687 
[0.008003] 
-0.011241 
[0.008037] 
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 1 2 3 4 5 ∆ Fed Fund Rate 0.022058 
(0.047823) 
0.022822 
(0.048177) 
0.023305 
(0.048282) 
-0.008960 
[0.044012] 
-0.005501 
[0.044186] ∆ US Industrial 
Production, Log 
0.044195 
(0.032975) 
0.042229 
(0.033725) 
0.044993 
(0.033651) 
0.040861 
[0.030260] 
0.040641 
[0.030556] ∆ US Industrial 
Production (Lagged), 
Log 
 0.031002 
(0.031801) 
  0.021255 
[0.029018] 
𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1  -1.050313*** (0.05582) -1.050338*** (0.056868) -1.03958*** (0.056465) -1.000247*** [0.052416] -1.004127*** [0.052986] 
R-squared 0.903922 0.905057 0.904529 0.922788 0.923180 
Adjusted R-squared 0.892692 0.892398 0.891799 0.912493 0.911761 
Panel B India 
 1 2 3 4 5 ∆ Exchange Rate (Lagged)   -0.046627 [0.054149]  -0.040393 [0.056442] ∆ FX Futures Rate 0.58028*** 
[0.037796] 
0.56796*** 
[0.033546] 
0.594233*** 
[0.035945] 
0.572832*** 
[0.036764] 
0.601518*** 
[0.037596] ∆ FX Futures Rate (Lagged) -0.16834** 
[0.066512] 
-0.18940** 
[0.06657] 
 -0.194281** 
[0.069235] 
 
∆ Foreign Exchange Intervention -0.025242 
[0.017235] 
-0.028046* 
[0.015124] 
-0.021223 
[0.015564] 
-0.027613 
[0.016845] 
-0.016752 
[0.016484] ∆ Foreign Exchange  
Intervention  
(Second Lagged) 
    -0.015353 
[0.014033] ∆ Foreign Exchange  
Intervention (First Lagged) 
-0.033327* 
[0.016474] 
-0.03989** 
[0.01589] 
-0.02247 
[0.015191 
-0.041345** 
[0.01666] 
-0.029127 
[0.017856] ∆ Futures-based Intervention 0.016098 
[0.014242] 
0.005614 
[0.011814] 
0.023756* 
[0.012168] 
0.008728 
[0.014138] 
0.022193 
[0.012799] ∆ Futures-based  
Intervention (Second Lagged) 
-0.0077 
[0.012288] 
-0.01061 
[0.011539] 
-0.023476* 
[0.012456] 
-0.008646 
[0.012187] 
-0.020912 
[0.012626] ∆ Futures-based  
Intervention (First Lagged) 
0.016107 
[0.017128] 
0.029297* 
[0.015798] 
-0.010844 
[0.017389] 
0.032282* 
[0.017401] 
-0.022331 
[0.01792] ∆ Policy Rate -0.3388*** 
[0.064666] 
-0.2926*** 
[0.058846] 
-0.28742*** 
[0.062791] 
-0.31193*** 
[0.063937] 
-0.27103*** 
[0.064162] ∆ Industrial Production, Log -0.1461*** 
[0.039384] 
-0.1657*** 
[0.035855] 
-0.17581*** 
[0.038409] 
-0.16076*** 
[0.038261] 
-0.16205*** 
[0.040535] ∆ Industrial Production,  
Log (Second Lagged) 
-0.027674 
[0.044522] 
-0.016753 
[0.043301] 
-0.036102 
[0.04437] 
-0.018832 
[0.044673] 
-0.048189 
[0.044958] 
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 1 2 3 4 5 ∆ Industrial Production,  
Log (First Lagged) 
0.077781 
[0.056598] 
0.153807** 
[0.05928] 
0.068935 
[0.050176 
0.134772** 
[0.060404] 
0.027464 
[0.049633] ∆ Consumer Price, Log 0.170851 
[0.140176] 
0.44260*** 
[0.126298] 
0.269331* 
[0.130294 
0.387159** 
[0.144291] 
0.224844 
[0.135064] ∆ Consumer Price, Log 
(Second Lagged) 
0.152315 
[0.121973] 
  0.094374 
[0.121211] 
 ∆ Consumer Price, Log 
(First Lagged) 
0.134414 
[0.12017] 
  0.047714 
[0.116616] 
 
∆ Net Export -0.017987 
[0.023138] 
-0.006906 
[0.021672] 
0.007092 
[0.024245] 
-0.010155 
[0.022342] 
-0.007524 
[0.02517] ∆ Net Export  
(Second Lagged) 
-0.0747*** 
[0.024039] 
-0.0802*** 
[0.022851] 
-0.059021** 
[0.021186] 
-0.08495*** 
[0.024381] 
-0.042995* 
[0.021494] ∆ Net Export  
(First Lagged) 
-0.1001*** 
[0.025012] 
-0.1041*** 
[0.024431] 
-0.084*** 
[0.024] 
-0.10876*** 
[0.025461] 
-0.056604** 
[0.024908] ∆ Fed Fund Rate 0.179173 
[0.106803] 
0.30855*** 
[0.091131] 
0.36992*** 
[0.094994 
0.290023** 
[0.10305] 
0.256085** 
[0.098244] ∆ Fed Fund Rate  
(Second Lagged) 
-0.225438* 
[0.107337] 
   -0.165325 
[0.107864] ∆ Fed Fund Rate  
(First Lagged) 
-0.160697 
[0.100659] 
-0.023362 
[0.095201] 
-0.093141 
[0.10404] 
-0.028916 
[0.100066] 
-0.208989* 
{0.10491] ∆ US Industrial Production, Log -0.027048 
0.064426] 
0.017946 
[0.061298] 
-0.031043 
[0.065311] 
0.019194 
[0.064797] 
-0.070756 
[0.068522] ∆ US Industrial  
Production,  
Log (Second Lagged) 
0.126986* 
[0.068781] 
0.165312** 
[0.064401] 
0.090731 
[0.065744 
0.159647** 
[0.06715] 
0.078847 
[0.070392] ∆ US Industrial  
Production,  
Log (First Lagged) 
0.078588 
[0.063822] 
0.098027 
[0.060222] 
0.105224 
[0.066259] 
0.082864 
[0.063298] 
0.126144* 
[0.067573] 𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1  -1.0969*** [0.122995] -1.1140*** [0.12114] -0.86995*** [0.080461] -1.10676*** [0.124326] -0.90109*** [0.085837] 
R-squared 0.979578 0.978406 0.975292 0.978737 0.97664 
Adjusted R-squared 0.960007 0.96241 0.95699 0.960026 0.956083 
Notes: Panel A and B exhibit the short-run estimations for Brazil and India, respectively. The asterisk denotes statistical 
significance *, **, and *** at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. Numbers in the parentheses ( ), represent the 
standard error. Numbers in the square brackets [ ], represent the HAC-corrected standard error. 
Let us now proceed by discussing the short-run estimations, which are depicted in Table 
(13). First, we find that futures-based FX intervention in Brazil significantly affects the exchange 
rate movements in the short-run, where increasing net purchase by the central bank would 
appreciate the exchange rate, vice versa. For the case of India, we find no evidence of the effect of 
futures-based FX intervention on the Indian Rupee exchange rate. However, our short-run 
estimations suggest that traditional FX intervention in the previous month significantly drives the 
current movements of the Indian Rupee exchange rate. Furthermore, we find that both domestic 
and external factors, such as policy rate, domestic economic growth, inflation rate, and US 
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economic growth necessarily influence the Indian Rupee exchange rate in the short run. On the 
contrary, our estimations show that the Brazilian exchange rate dominantly is driven by the internal 
factor, i.e., inflation rate, in the short run. Moreover, we find that the coefficients of error correction 
(ECM) are statistically significant at any conventional level, either for the case of Brazil or India. 
Specifically, our estimations show that the magnitude of ECM for both cases are generally below 
one, which indicates that a deviation from the equilibrium level of the exchange rate in the current 
period will be corrected by more than 100 percent, suggesting that both every deviation in Indian 
and Brazilian exchange rate equilibrium will be corrected in a fluctuating manner. 
B. The Futures-based FX Intervention and Exchange Rate Pass-through Effect 
Our main empirical results are displayed in Table (17), which portray the long-run estimations 
analyzing the role of futures-based FX intervention on exchange rate pass-through in Brazil and 
India. 
Let us now begin the empirical investigations on the long-run effect of exchange rate pass-
through. For the case of Brazil, we find that elasticity coefficients of exchange rate on import price 
are statistically significant in the (4) and (5) column estimations at a ten percent confidence level. 
Specifically, it suggests that the depreciated exchange rate inelastically leads to less efficient 
import prices. For the case of India, we find an approximately similar case where the depreciated 
exchange rate would decrease the efficiency of import price. However, the exchange rate pass-
through in India is seemingly higher than in Brazil, where the estimated elasticity coefficients 
approximate the unitary elasticity. Although with different magnitude, these findings confirm the 
exchange rate pass-through theory where the pass-through mechanisms effectively transmitted by 
tenacious structures of exchange rate instability that would disrupt trade, leading to a rise in the 
dollar burden, pushes the price of imported goods. (Menkhoff 2013). Céspedes, Chang, and 
Velasco (2004) also confirm that weaker local currency in financially vulnerable countries could 
deteriorate debt to service difficulties, and the balance sheet of domestic banks and firms get worst 
afterward. 
Table 12  
Long-run Estimations 
Panel A Brazil 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Exchange Rate, Log 
-0.601711 
[0.524557] 
-0.609509 
[0.505476] 
-0.604392 
[0.568317] 
-0.66349* 
[0.357252] 
-0.659848* 
[0.373177] 
Exchange Rate, Log  × Foreign Exchange 
Intervention 
0.472435 
[0.911303] 
0.448922 
[0.904038] 
0.567737 
[0.99851] 
0.33746 
[0.668023] 
0.339855 
[0.690969] 
Exchange Rate, Log  × Futures-based 
Intervention 
0.286458 
[0.320522] 
0.337931 
[0.295381] 
0.151283 
[0.419237] 
0.590862** 
[0.261142] 
0.573631** 
[0.261968] 
Panel B India 
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 1 2 3 4 5 
Exchange Rate, Log -1.005255* 
[0.578235] 
-0.909794** 
[0.444131] 
-1.015378 
[0.631472] 
-0.872523* 
[0.499091] 
-0.857554 
[0.697313] 
Exchange Rate, Log  × Foreign Exchange 
Intervention 
0.001416 
[0.003719] 
0.001195 
[0.003228] 
0.001628 
[0.004153] 
0.003499 
[0.004393] 
-0.003369 
[0.006680] 
Exchange Rate, Log  × Futures-based 
Intervention 
-0.005154 
[0.005784] 
-0.00507 
[0.004992] 
-0.012369 
[0.015234] 
-0.004786 
[0.005753 
-0.004286 
[0.007831] 
Notes: The asterisk denotes statistical significance *, **, and *** at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. Numbers in 
the parentheses ( ), represent the standard error. Numbers in the square brackets [ ], represent the HAC-corrected standard error. 
We now proceed by investigating the long-run impact of FX intervention and futures-based 
FX intervention on the exchange rate pass-through in Brazil and India. For the FX intervention, 
we find no evidences, either for the case of Brazil or India, concerning its effect on exchange rate 
pass-through. For the role of futures-based FX intervention, we find that it effectively reduces the 
exchange rate pass-through in Brazil. Our empirical results also suggest that the reducing-effect of 
futures-based FX intervention (i.e., when the central bank takes net purchases) is approximately 
perfect, which indicated by the interaction term coefficients of futures-based FX intervention 
nearly offset the elasticity coefficients of exchange rate on import price (see Panel A, column 4 
and 5 estimations). This finding, in general, aligns with Gonzalez, Khametshin, Peydró, & Polo 
(2019), which found that futures-based FX intervention significantly reduced the negative effect 
of the depreciated exchange rate during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and Taper tantrum on 
the balance sheet of highly external resilience banks. Specifically, they show that a large futures-
based FX intervention program supplying derivatives against FX risks halves the adverse effects 
of exchange rate depreciation. For the case of India, our empirical results find no evidence 
regarding the impact of futures-based FX intervention on exchange rate pass-through.  
Our findings demonstrate that the role of futures-based FX intervention is more extensive 
in Brazil than in India. Several factors support the finding. Principally, the derivatives-based FX 
intervention would be concentrated in the more developed market. In the case of Brazil, the FX 
derivatives market is more developed in the futures market, while the forwards market is more 
developed than the futures market. Second, the Brazilian central bank has intervened regularly in 
foreign exchange markets since the adoption of its floating exchange rate regime in January 1999, 
including through regular use of the FX futures market. Given its high liquidity, the central bank 
has been encouraged to intervene more frequently and systematically in this market (Upper & 
Valli, 2016). The RBI has also intervened through the FX futures market, but occasionally and in 
a limited amount. Given the Indian derivatives market mostly concentrated in the OTC market 
(e.g., forwards), the derivatives-based FX intervention is more extensive in the forwards market. 
Third, in Brazil, the eligibility to issue the main futures contract (DOL) is limited to ensure the 
well-functioning hedging in the FX futures market. On the contrary, hedging activities in the FX 
futures market are vulnerable to be misused. Therefore, the Indian FX futures market is unlikely 
to fulfill the genuine hedging requirements of the participants, which is possible in the OTC market 
(Gopinath, 2010). 
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V Robustness Tests 
For the robustness checks, we estimate the long-run model using two alternative approaches: Fully 
Modified OLS (FM-OLS) and Dynamic OLS (D-OLS). Those two estimators are frequently 
utilized in estimating the long-run model. The FM-OLS is designed to provide optimal estimates 
of cointegrating regressions that counting the serial correlation effects and the endogeneity in the 
regressors that results from the existence of a cointegrating relationship (Phillips, 1995). On the 
other hand, the D-OLS is robustly superior in small samples, as well as being able to account for 
possible simultaneity within regressors (Masih & Masih, 1996). 
Table 13  
Robustness Checks: The Futures-based FX Intervention and Exchange Rate Dynamics 
 Brazil India 
 FM-OLS D-OLS FM-OLS D-OLS 
FX Futures Rate 
0.939447*** 
(0.017589) 
1.009969*** 
[0.032954] 
0.88071*** 
(19.65022) 
0.936694*** 
[0.074072] 
Foreign Exchange 
Intervention 
0.006828 
(0.007275) 
0.021012 
[0.020650] 
0.014476 
(0.027839) 
-0.039444 
[0.037300] 
Futures-based Intervention 
-0.011791 
(0.007475) 
-0.041075** 
[0.017615] 
0.072232*** 
(0.018613) 
-0.219135 
[0.147324] 
Policy Rate 
0.025863 
(0.0156450 
0.022601 
[0.021305] 
0.242423*** 
(0.0778230 
0.051428 
[0.139567] 
Industrial Production, Log 
0.001811 
(0.019859) 
0.061112 
[0.042951] 
-0.229508*** 
(0.0711) 
-0.597354*** 
[0.189201] 
Consumer Price, Log 
0.070682*** 
(0.025122) 
0.057759 
[0.041678] 
0.570222*** 
(0.123322) 
0.823698** 
[0.290959] 
Net Export 
-0.036164*** 
(0.012444) 
-0.035371 
[0.025871] 
-0.018847 
(0.035901) 
0.148331 
[0.084038] 
Fed Fund Rate 
0.059323*** 
(0.022352) 
0.045881 
[0.030719] 
0.098845 
(0.119622) 
-0.229844 
[0.201081] 
US Industrial Production, 
Log 
-0.042758*** 
(0.014456) 
-0.028946 
[0.018852] 
-0.187841** 
(0.083039) 
0.246035 
[0.180018] 
R-squared 0.990508 0.998592 0.971433 0.99846 
Adjusted R-squared 0.989399 0.997536 0.965005 0.993421 
Notes: The asterisk denotes statistical significance *, **, and *** at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. Numbers in 
the parentheses ( ), represent the standard error. Numbers in the square brackets [ ], represent the HAC-corrected standard error. 
Schwartz Criterion is performed to determine both lags and lead in D-OLS estimations. 
First, we address the robustness estimations for the empirical relationship between 
exchange rate and FX intervention and futures-based FX intervention, which are displayed in 
Table (18). The empirical results from FM-OLS and D-OLS confirm our empirical results, which 
states that the FX futures rate significantly drives the actual exchange rate. Second, we find that 
Brazilian futures-based FX intervention is statistically significant and confirm our primary 
estimations in D-OLS estimation, while it is statistically insignificant in FM-OLS estimation. 
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Although FM-OLS generates insignificant parameters, these estimations consistently generate 
positive parameters, which support our primary estimation. For the case of India, we find that the 
futures-based FX intervention is significantly positive at one percent confidence level in FM-OLS 
estimation. It suggests that futures-based FX intervention in India depreciates the exchange rate. 
However, the estimated parameter from the FM-OLS estimation seemingly biases due to the small 
sample, while D-OLS is superior against small sample bias (Masih & Masih, 1996). In this case, 
therefore, we can conclude that futures-based FX intervention in India does not affect exchange 
rate dynamics, which confirm our primary estimations. 
Table 14  
Robustness Checks: The Futures-based FX Intervention and ERPT 
 Brazil India 
 FM-OLS D-OLS FM-OLS D-OLS 
Exchange Rate, Log 
-0.817983*** 
 (0.089768) 
-0.804225*** 
[0.078408] 
-0.693714*** 
[0.223577] 
-0.64245** 
[0.282573] 
Exchange Rate, Log  × 
Foreign Exchange 
Intervention 
0.110132 
 (0.094962) 
0.089998 
[0.165375] 
-0.003080* 
[0.001718] 
-0.002696 
[0.001815] 
Exchange Rate, Log  × 
Futures-based Intervention 
0.386724*** 
 (0.095124) 
0.625128*** 
[0.134135] 
0.001747 
[0.001471] 
0.002682* 
[0.001568] 
R-squared 0.772897 0.860889 0.496787 0.563145 
Adjusted R-squared 0.764688 0.837703 0.452056 0.490336 
Notes: The asterisk denotes statistical significance *, **, and *** at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. Numbers in 
the parentheses ( ), represent the standard error. Numbers in the square brackets [ ], represent the HAC-corrected standard error. 
For India’s estimations, we use linear trend specification since it generates higher R-squared. Schwartz Criterion is performed to 
determine both lags and lead in D-OLS estimation. 
For the second robustness checks, we examine the consistency of our empirical findings 
concerning the role of futures-based FX intervention on exchange rate pass-through in Brazil and 
India. Based on our robustness estimations, Brazilian futures-based FX intervention is effective in 
weakening the exchange rate pass-through effect, which is indicated by statistically significant 
coefficients at any conventional level. Based on the FM-OLS and D-OLS estimations, we 
specifically find that futures-based FX intervention could reduce the exchange rate pass-through 
effect by about 47 percent to 77 percent. For the case of India, we find that futures-based FX 
intervention has relatively no effect in reducing exchange rate pass-through. Although we find that 
it is statistically significant at a ten percent confidence level in D-OLS, we cannot conclude that 
the Indian futures-based FX intervention significantly affects the exchange rate pass-through since 
it is statistically weak, resulting in near-zero parameters, and generally inconsistent compared to 
the majority of estimations. 
VI Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we examine the effectiveness of futures-based FX intervention in determining the 
exchange rate dynamics and exchange rate pass-through in India and Brazil. As we mentioned 
earlier, they are strikingly different in terms of operating such intervention. In general, the 
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Brazilian Central Bank (BCC) regularly operates the futures-based FX intervention from March 
2002, while the Reserves Bank of India (RBI) still use it occasionally and in a limited way. This 
investigation allows us to evaluate and take a lesson learned from those countries’ policy designs 
and outcomes in utilizing the futures-based FX intervention. Specifically, this investigation also 
could answer whether the magnitude and frequency of the intervention and the fundamental 
aspects of economic background are matter in determining the effectiveness of futures-based FX 
intervention 
Our empirical results show that the futures-based FX interventions in Brazil are effective 
in determining the exchange rate movement and exchange rate pass-through, while it is the 
opposite of the case of India. The results are also confirmed in the robustness checks estimations. 
This finding sheds light on several crucial features that differentiate the case of Brazil and India.  
Specifically, it implies that the effectiveness of futures-based FX intervention is related to several 
essential aspects such as the historical background of the economic transformation, the 
establishment of the FX futures market, and the tradeoff between futures and OTC market 
development. On the other hand, it suggests that an effective futures-based FX intervention occurs 
only in particular conditions.  
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